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Abstract  
 
In this paper, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary disclosures. 
Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual compensation to vest. 
We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news 
earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the level of stock-based compensation 
and the endogeneity of pay duration. In addition, we find that the effect of pay duration is more 
pronounced for firms with weaker governance and for firms with a more opaque information 
environment, where the marginal benefits of additional disclosures are higher. Our additional 
analyses indicate that managers with a longer pay duration issue more accurate earnings 
forecasts. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by documenting that lengthening the 
vesting periods of managers’ compensation can induce managers to be more forthcoming with 
bad news. 
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary 
disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual 
compensation to vest. Using management earnings forecasts to capture voluntary disclosures, we 
investigate whether managers with long pay durations are more likely to issue bad news earnings 
forecasts and issue them more frequently than those with short pay durations. We focus on bad 
news forecasts because managers generally disclose good news in a timely fashion, but are 
reluctant to disclose bad news (Kothari et al. 2009).1  
Our study is motivated by the observation that the provision of stock-based compensation 
may fail to align managers’ interests with those of the shareholders if the vesting period is short. 
A growing number of studies document that stock-based compensation can motivate managers to 
pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term firm value (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Bolton et al. 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). In the disclosure setting, 
while Nagar et al. (2003) find that managers’ equity incentives can mitigate disclosure-related 
agency conflicts and increase voluntary disclosures, the findings in Kothari et al. (2009) suggest 
that stock-based compensation can motivate managers to withhold bad news due to their 
concerns about short-term stock price drops.  
Some researchers argue that to address managerial short-termism, executive compensation 
should be linked to long-term performance. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2010) argue that 
short-term pay arrangements are likely to have driven the excessive risk taking behavior 
exhibited by bank executives before the financial crisis and suggest that increasing the horizon of 
executive compensation is critical to addressing managerial myopia. A number of executives and 
                                                 
1 As discussed below, in an additional analysis, we also examine the effect of pay duration on good news forecasts 
for the sake of completeness.  
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government officials share the same view. For example, former Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner (2009) argued that “Companies should seek to pay top executives in ways that are 
tightly aligned with the long-term value and soundness of the firm.”2 
However, despite the widespread recognition of the importance of linking executives’ pay 
to long-term firm performance, little research has examined the effect of the pay horizon on 
corporate decisions. In this study, we focus on voluntary disclosures, particularly of bad news. A 
longer pay duration can motivate managers to disclose bad news for several reasons. First, a 
longer pay duration can improve the interest alignment between shareholders and managers 
(Gopalan et al. 2013). To the extent that a lack of disclosure of bad news is a manifestation of 
disclosure-related agency problems (Nagar et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2009), a longer pay 
duration can induce managers to be more forthcoming with bad news. Second, disclosures of bad 
news can help firms improve their investment efficiency, thereby benefiting managers in the long 
run, although not necessarily in the short run (Kumar et al. 2012). As the welfare of managers 
with longer pay durations is linked to the long-term value of their firms, they thus have a 
stronger incentive to disclose bad news. Third, the litigation concerns of withholding bad news 
are higher for managers who have long-term stakes in their firms (Chen et al. 2008). As such, the 
incentive to withhold bad news can be reduced by extending the vesting period of the manager’s 
stock-based compensation. Lastly, because of the long vesting period, managers with longer pay 
durations are less likely to exercise their options and sell their shares in the near future. 
Accordingly, these managers are less sensitive to short-term stock price drops, motivating them 
to be more forthcoming with bad news. 
                                                 
2 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2009) made a similar remark, “Management compensation 
policies should be aligned with the long-term prudential interests of the institutions … and [should] avoid short-term 
payments for transactions with long-term horizons.” In addition, Goldman Sachs’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein (2009) 
urged that “An individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To 
ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to future delivery and/or deferred exercise.”   
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This line of reasoning suggests that managers with longer pay durations tend to be more 
forthcoming with bad news. In addition, long pay durations motivate managers to disclose 
information to address agency problems and to reduce the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. Therefore, the effect of pay duration is expected to be stronger when the 
monitoring of a manager is weaker and when there is a high level of information asymmetry. We 
thus expect the effect of pay duration on bad news disclosures to be more pronounced for firms 
with weaker governance (proxied for by lower board independence and lower institutional 
ownership) and firms with a poor information environment (proxied for by lower analyst 
coverage and a higher probability of informed trade).  
Following Gopalan et al. (2013), we measure pay duration as the weighted average of the 
vesting periods of the four components of CEO compensation: salary, bonus, restricted stock 
grants, and stock option grants, with the weight being the relative size of each component. (The 
vesting period for salaries and cash bonuses is naturally zero.) The stock-based compensation 
measure used in prior studies implicitly assumes that restricted stock grants and stock option 
grants have equal vesting periods. In contrast, the measure of pay duration explicitly incorporates 
the length of the vesting schedules of different stock or option grants.  
Based on a sample of 7,686 firm-year observations from Russell 3000 firms between 2006 
and 2010, our analyses yield the following main findings. First, we find that after controlling for 
the level of stock-based compensation and other potential determinants of voluntary disclosures, 
pay duration is significantly positively correlated with the likelihood and frequency of bad news 
earnings forecasts. This result indicates that managers with longer pay durations are more likely 
to disclose bad news forecasts and to disclose bad news forecasts more frequently. 
Second, consistent with our prediction, we find that the effect of pay duration on the 
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disclosure of bad news is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and firms with a 
more opaque information environment. Specifically, we find that pay duration has a stronger 
effect on bad news disclosure for firms with lower board independence, lower institutional 
ownership, lower analyst coverage, and a higher probability of informed trade (PIN).   
We conduct several additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results and to provide 
additional insights. First, to address the potential endogeneity of pay duration, we control for 
firm fixed effects and perform a two-stage analysis using CEO tenure as the instrumental 
variable for pay duration. Both analyses lead to similar results. Second, we construct an 
alternative measure of pay duration that incorporates the equity grants awarded in previous years 
in addition to those awarded in the current year. The inferences from the analysis using the 
alternative measure remain the same. We do not use this measure in the main analyses because 
the calculation of this measure requires additional assumptions, which are likely to lead to 
measurement errors. Third, using forecast accuracy to capture the quality of voluntary disclosure, 
we find that pay duration is positively correlated with the accuracy of bad news earnings 
forecasts, suggesting that pay duration improves both the quantity and quality of voluntary 
disclosures. Fourth, we investigate the effect of pay duration on the disclosure of good news and 
fail to find evidence that a longer pay duration is significantly associated with a greater 
likelihood or frequency of good news disclosure.3 Lastly, additional analyses indicate that our 
results are not driven by the following alternative explanations: (1) managers with long pay 
durations strategically disclose bad news earlier and withhold bad news in the future, and (2) the 
                                                 
3 For the sake of completeness and to reconcile our findings with those of Nagar et al. (2003), we also examine the 
effect of pay duration on total management forecasts (including both good and bad news forecasts). Given the 
results based on bad news forecasts, not surprisingly, we find a significant coefficient on pay duration. In addition, 
consistent with Nagar et al. (2003), we find that the level of stock-based compensation has a significantly positive 
effect on the total management forecasts when we exclude pay duration or when we use the residual of pay duration 
(obtained from a regression of pay duration on the size of stock-based compensation) in place of pay duration in our 
regressions, although the coefficient on this variable is insignificant when pay duration is included in the analyses. 
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effect of pay duration captures a non-linear relationship between stock-based compensation and 
disclosure.  
Our study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, our findings add to the 
voluntary disclosure literature that links executive compensation to management earnings 
forecasts. While prior research (e.g., Nagar et al. 2003) has established that the level of stock-
based compensation influences the incentive alignment between managers and shareholders in 
the setting of voluntary disclosures, we extend this line of research by examining another 
important and distinctive feature of stock-based compensation, namely, the length of the vesting 
period. Given the recent evidence that stock-based compensation can induce managers to focus 
only on short-term performance at the expense of long-term firm value, it is important to 
understand whether and how increasing managers’ pay duration can improve the effectiveness of 
stock-based compensation in addressing disclosure-related agency problems. Our study sheds 
light on this issue by providing evidence that given the same level of stock-based compensation, 
a longer duration can induce managers to be more forthcoming with bad news. Note that unlike 
Nagar et al. (2003), who do not distinguish between good news and bad news forecasts, we focus 
on bad news earnings forecasts. Such a focus is important because managers generally provide 
good news in a timely fashion but are reluctant to disclose bad news (Kothari et al. 2009). Thus, 
it is important to understand how managers can be induced to disclose bad news (Kumar et al. 
2012).  
Second, our study contributes to the extant literature on executive compensation by 
focusing on the time horizon of stock-based compensation, which has received little attention. 
Gopalan et al. (2013) examine the determinants of pay duration and its effect on abnormal 
accruals. Cadman et al. (2012) study the determinants of the vesting terms of option grants. Our 
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study complements these studies by examining how pay duration affects voluntary disclosures. 
Our finding that a longer pay duration can induce managers to increase bad news disclosures 
should be of interest to shareholders and Boards of Directors given the importance of disclosures 
for corporate governance (e.g., Beyer et al. 2010).4  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related prior 
research and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and the variable 
measurement. Section 4 provides the main empirical results and Section 5 reports additional 
tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Prior Research on Stock-based Compensation and Voluntary Disclosure 
Through their involvement in their firms’ operations, managers enjoy an information 
advantage over shareholders with respect to firm profitability. Managers’ disclosures of such 
information can reduce the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, thereby 
increasing stock liquidity, decreasing the cost of capital, and enhancing firm value (e.g., Glosten 
and Milgrom 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Disclosures also enable shareholders to 
better monitor managers, again leading to an increase in firm value (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
1989; Bushman and Smith 2001). 
 While disclosures can benefit shareholders, they are costly to managers. Disclosures 
decrease managers’ information advantage and thus potentially reduce insider trading profits 
                                                 
4 Note that we document an important benefit of increasing pay duration and we do not investigate the optimality of 
pay duration. One potential cost of increasing pay duration is the additional risk premium for which firms have to 
compensate managers. Gopalan et al. (2013) provide some insights on this issue in their analysis of the determinants 
of pay duration. Specifically, they find that pay duration is longer for firms with more growth opportunities, long-
term assets, high R&D intensity, lower operating risk, and better recent stock performance. Cadman et al. (2012) 
study the determinants of the vesting terms of option grants and arrive at similar conclusions. Note that we control 
for these determinants in the main analyses and/or in sensitivity tests, and we also conduct additional analyses to 
further address the potential endogeneity of pay duration.  
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(Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). Because disclosures can enhance investors’ monitoring of 
managers, they can reduce managers’ consumption of perks and their control over the firm. As a 
result, managers prefer to make fewer disclosures, particularly disclosures of bad news, because 
the shareholders might act on such information (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). In addition, because 
disclosures can help the labor market to better assess the talent and capabilities of managers, 
managers are reluctant to disclose information if they are uncertain how the market will respond 
to their disclosures (Nagar 1999). The reluctance to reveal information to shareholders is referred 
to as disclosure-related agency problems and such problems arise when the managers’ interests 
are not aligned with those of the shareholders (Nagar et al. 2003). 
Prior research suggests that stock-based compensation can align the interests of managers 
with those of the shareholders, thus reducing agency problems in general (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Morck et al. 1988) and disclosure-related agency problems in particular (Nagar et al. 
2003). While stock-based compensation can increase the disclosure of good news because it 
provides managers with an incentive to boost the stock price, its effect on the disclosure of bad 
news is less clear. Stock-based compensation may elicit the disclosure of bad news if the stock 
market interprets non-disclosure to be a worse signal (Milgrom 1981; Verrecchia 1983). 
However, Kothari et al. (2009) find that managers tend to withhold bad news and that this 
tendency is stronger when the managers’ personal wealth is more closely tied to their firms’ 
stock price. This suggests that stock-based compensation may actually dampen the issuance of 
bad news disclosures. Moreover, the results of Kothari et al. (2009) are consistent with recent 
findings that managers with stock-based compensation tend to focus more on the current stock 
price, rather than the long-term value of the firm, and that these managers may engage in value-
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destroying activities in pursuit of short-term gains.5  
As discussed above, researchers and practitioners suggest that the excessive focus on short-
term stock prices induced by stock-based compensation can be mitigated by lengthening the 
vesting period of the stock-based compensation. When the vesting period is longer, the manager 
will care more about the long-term value of the firm and less about its short-term stock price. 
Consistent with this notion, Gopalan et al. (2013) find a negative relationship between managers’ 
pay duration and abnormal accruals (their proxy for managers’ propensity to engage in myopic 
behavior to boost short-term earnings performance). This result suggests that longer pay 
durations improve the incentive alignment between shareholders and managers. It thus follows 
that given the same level of stock-based compensation, the effect of stock-based compensation 
may vary with its duration. In this study, we examine whether long pay durations can mitigate 
disclosure-related agency problems and improve the voluntary disclosure of bad news. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we develop our hypotheses by discussing the costs and benefits of voluntary 
disclosure and how such costs and benefits vary with pay duration. Prior analytical and empirical 
research has documented the costs and benefits of disclosure. While some costs and benefits, 
such as increased liquidity and lower cost of capital, may affect both short-term and long-term 
focused managers, other costs and benefits may vary with the horizon of the managers’ interests. 
If managers with long pay durations enjoy greater benefits from enhanced disclosures and/or if 
disclosures are less costly for them, then they will be more forthcoming than those with short pay 
                                                 
5 For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that managers with higher 
equity incentives are more likely to engage in earnings management. Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) 
document that the likelihood of accounting restatements is positively related to managers’ in-the-money option 
holdings. These studies argue that because the managers who receive stock/option grants tend to sell their shares and 
thus benefit from higher stock prices, stock-based compensation can induce managers to inflate short-term earnings 
and stock prices. However, some recent studies have found that managers’ equity incentives are not related to the 
incidence of accounting fraud or accounting irregularities (e.g., Erickson et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2010). 
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durations. In the following paragraphs, we discuss why managers with long pay durations are 
more likely to disclose bad news than those with short pay durations. 
First, prior research suggests that a lack of disclosure, particularly that of bad news, is a 
manifestation of agency problems (Nagar et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2009). Specifically, 
disclosing bad news can increase shareholders’ monitoring and potentially lead to adverse 
consequences for managers. As discussed above, Gopalan et al. (2013) argue that longer pay 
durations can reduce agency problems. It thus follows that longer pay durations can reduce 
disclosure-related agency problems and that managers with long pay durations are more likely to 
disclose forward-looking bad news than those with short pay durations.  
Second, Kumar et al. (2012) analytically show that bad news disclosures can improve 
investment efficiency and ultimately firm value in the long-run. They also show that relative to 
managers with short horizons, those with long-term stakes in their firms have a greater 
propensity to disclose bad news in order to improve investment efficiency because they can 
benefit from the improved investment efficiency and the higher firm value in the long-run.6 
Given that managers with long pay durations have long-term stakes in their firms and benefit 
more from efficient long-term investments, they have greater incentives to provide more timely 
disclosures of bad news to avoid investment distortions.7 
Third, prior research argues that withholding bad news can increase litigation costs (e.g., 
                                                 
6 Kumar et al. (2012) argue that bad news disclosures improve the efficiency of shareholders’ capital allocations and, 
therefore, investment efficiency. Although disclosures of bad news entail short-term stock price drops, for managers 
with long-term stakes in their firms, the long-term gains from the enhanced firm value (as a result of improved 
efficiency in investment) outweigh the costs of the short-term stock price drops. This is not the case for managers 
with short-term stakes because the effect of short-term price drops is likely to dominate. We acknowledge that some 
of the assumptions in Kumar et al. (2012) may be stylized, such as the one that shareholders have a substantial 
influence on corporate investment decisions. However, in their model, shareholders can be interpreted as the board, 
whose mandate is to approve all important investment decisions. In addition, we note that their conclusion applies 
more to extreme news. As a result, when we analyze good news and bad news disclosures, we treat news with a 
small magnitude as neutral news. 
7 In contrast, if managers with short pay durations are more likely to engage in myopic investments (Gopalan et al. 
2013), they will prefer less disclosure so that they can limit shareholders’ ability to monitor them (e.g., Edlin and 
Stigliz 1995).     
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Skinner 1994; Field et al. 2005). The cost of the non-disclosure of bad news should be greater for 
managers with long pay durations, whose welfare is tied to firm value in the long run, just as it is 
for family owners (Chen et al. 2008). Facing higher litigation costs in relation to withholding bad 
news, managers with longer pay durations are expected to be more forthcoming with bad news. 
Lastly, due to the longer vesting period of option/stock grants, managers with long pay 
durations are less likely to exercise the options and sell their shares in the short term. To 
substantiate this statement, in an untabulated analysis, we find that managers’ stock and option 
grants are significantly positively correlated with the net sales of the shares in the next year when 
the pay duration is short, but not when the pay duration is long. That is, the positive association 
between managers’ stock/option grants and their tendency to sell shares, as documented in prior 
research (e.g., Ofek and Yermack 2000), is dampened when the pay duration is longer. As such, 
managers with long pay durations are less sensitive to short-term stock price drops and have 
weaker incentives to withhold bad news than those with short pay durations.8  
The above discussion suggests that managers with long pay durations are more likely to 
disclose bad news than those with short pay durations. In this study, we use management 
earnings forecasts to capture voluntary disclosures. Thus, the first hypothesis (in the alternative 
form) is as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, managers with long pay durations are more likely to issue bad news 
forecasts and issue bad news forecasts more frequently than managers with short pay 
durations. 
The discussion thus far does not imply whether there is any difference in the good news 
disclosures between managers with long and those with short pay durations. The literature 
                                                 
8 We acknowledge that withholding bad news before insider sales is subject to litigation risk (Cheng and Lo 2006). 
However, we reason that when the potential benefits of this strategy are higher, managers will be more likely to 
engage in such behavior than when the benefits are lower. To the extent that the benefits would be higher for 
managers with short pay durations, as they are more likely to sell shares in the near future than those with long pay 
durations, we expect them to be more likely to withhold bad news than those with long pay durations.  
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generally shows that managers tend to disclose good news and it is unclear whether this tendency 
varies with pay duration. As such, we do not have a formal hypothesis for good news forecasts. 
In one of the additional analyses, however, we examine the effect of pay duration on good news 
forecasts for the sake of completeness.  
Our second and third hypotheses relate to the circumstances under which pay duration is 
likely to be more effective in motivating managers to disclosure bad news. Prior research has 
found that firms with better governance are more effective in monitoring managers, addressing 
agency problems and reducing information asymmetry, as they demand more information from 
their managers. Indeed, prior research has found that firms with more independent boards and 
firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to disclose and tend to disclose more 
frequently (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005). Given that long pay durations also motivate managers to 
disclose bad news to address agency problems and reduce information asymmetry, it thus 
follows that the marginal effect of pay duration is likely to be lower for firms with better 
governance. In contrast, for firms with poor governance, i.e., less independent boards and lower 
institutional ownership, the effect of pay duration is expected to be more pronounced. 
Similarly, when the information environment of a firm is already rich, further enhancing 
disclosure arguably has a smaller marginal effect (e.g., Verrecchia 1990).9 In contrast, for firms 
with a more opaque information environment, the benefits of enhancing disclosure are greater 
and, therefore, managers with long pay durations will be more motivated to disclose information. 
Thus, pay duration has a stronger effect on bad news disclosures in firms with less transparent 
information environments.  
The above discussions lead to the following hypotheses (stated in the alternative form): 
                                                 
9 As in many prior studies, we take the quality of the existing information environment as a given and consider the 
incremental effect of additional disclosures.  
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H2: The effect of pay duration on bad news disclosures, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger 
for firms with weaker governance than for other firms. 
H3: The effect of pay duration on bad news disclosures, as hypothesized in H1, is stronger 
for firms with more opaque information environments than for other firms. 
As discussed below, we consider two proxies for the effectiveness of governance: board 
independence and institutional ownership. For the transparency of the information environment, 
we also use two proxies: analyst coverage and the probability of informed trades (PIN).  
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
We obtain the required data from various sources. We obtain the executive compensation 
data from Equilar for a broad set of firms included in the Russell 3000 index. Equilar provides 
detailed information on executive compensation from 2006 onward. The data coverage in 
Equilar is comprehensive and includes data items that are not available from ExecuComp, such 
as the grant date fair value and the vesting schedule of each equity compensation component. 
Such information is pivotal to the measurement of pay duration. We collect the data on 
management earnings forecasts from First Call’s Company Issued Guidance file. For the control 
variables, we obtain financial information data from Compustat, stock price/return data from 
CRSP, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, equity offerings data from Security Data 
Corporation’s Global New Issues database, and boards of director data from Corporate Library. 
Table 1 describes our sample selection process. Because we analyze how the duration of 
managers’ compensation awarded in year t influences the disclosure of earnings forecasts in year 
t+1, we require the CEO of the firm in year t+1 to have compensation data in year t.10 This 
                                                 
10 Cases where the CEO in year t+1 was not the CEO in year t are included in our sample as long as the executive 
works in the same firm (e.g., being the CFO). 
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procedure results in 10,920 firm-year observations in Equilar for the five-year period from 2006 
to 2010. Our sample period ends with 2010 because our management forecast data obtained from 
First Call stop in November 2011.11 Note that because our research design requires a one-year 
lag for pay duration, our analyses focus on management earnings forecasts issued during the 
period beginning with 2007. Of these observations, 150 firm-years are excluded because we are 
unable to find actual reported earnings figures and earnings announcement dates from First Call. 
In addition, 3,084 firm-years are excluded because of missing values on the control variables. 
This procedure leaves us with a sample of 7,686 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Measurement of Pay Duration 
Pay duration is the main variable of interest in our study. It captures the time horizon of 
managers’ incentives arising from a mix of short-term and long-term CEO compensation. 
Following Gopalan et al. (2013), we measure pay duration (P_DURATION) as the weighted 
average of the vesting periods of the four CEO compensation components in a given year: salary, 
bonus, restricted stock grants, and stock option grants, with the weight being the relative size of 
each compensation component. Specifically, pay duration is calculated as follows: 
ܲ_ܦܷܴܣܶܫܱܰ ൌ	 ∑ ܴ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݁݀	ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜ ൈ ݐ௜	 ൅ 	∑ ܱ݌ݐ݅݋݊௝ ൈ ݐ௝	
௡మ௝ୀଵ
௡భ௜ୀଵ
݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ൅ ܤ݋݊ݑݏ ൅	∑ ܴ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݁݀	ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௜ ൅	∑ ܱ݌ݐ݅݋݊௝௡మ௝ୀଵ௡భ௜ୀଵ
	, 
where Salary is the dollar value of annual salary, Bonus the dollar value of annual bonus, 
Restricted Stocki the grant date fair value of restricted stock grant i with a vesting period ti 
(measured in the number of years), and Optionj the grant date fair value of stock option grant j 
with a vesting period tj (measured in the number of years). n1 (n2) is the total number of restricted 
                                                 
11 We include observations from fiscal year 2010 (and corresponding management forecast data in 2011) to increase 
the sample size and the power of the test, but this data restriction introduces two complications. First, for year 2010, 
we cannot obtain actual EPS or analyst consensus forecasts from the First Call database. As a result, we obtain such 
data from I/B/E/S. Second, the management forecast coverage for 2011 is incomplete. These complications do not 
bias our results, but are likely to introduce noise into the analyses. However, our inference remains the same when 
we restrict our sample period to 2006 to 2009 (untabulated). 
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stock grants (stock option grants) in a given year.12 See Appendix B for an example of the 
calculation of pay duration. Note that although the vesting period is zero for salary and bonus, it 
is important to include them in the denominator. Pay duration is constructed to capture 
managers’ horizons induced by their annual compensation. If a manager’s compensation is 
primarily in the form of salary and bonus, granting her a small amount of options and stocks with 
a very long vesting period will not induce her to act in the interests of long-term shareholders.  
One complication with the calculation of P_DURATION is that the number of securities 
and their vesting schedules are sometimes contingent on future performance. For these securities, 
we follow Gopalan et al. (2013) and make the following assumptions in the calculation. First, 
when the vesting of a grant is contingent on future performance but the number of securities is 
fixed, we assume that this grant will vest all at once at the end of the period over which 
performance is measured. Second, when a grant has a performance-based vesting schedule, we 
assume that this grant will vest according to the initially specified vesting schedule. Third, when 
a grant is part of a long-term incentive plan in which the exact number of securities offered is 
contingent on future performance, we assume that the number of securities offered is the target 
number of securities and that the vesting begins after the end of the performance period.  
There are two limitations with the annual-based pay duration measure. First, it assumes that 
managers exercise all of the grants once they vest. This is not necessarily true. Some managers 
may hold the options and stocks for an extended period after they vest. Thus, the horizon of CEO 
compensation is longer than that indicated by the pay duration measure. However, there is no 
compelling reason that this issue will introduce a systematic bias. Second, the measure does not 
incorporate the effects of existing stock and option holdings. It also does not incorporate deferred 
                                                 
12 When grants of restricted stocks and stock options have a graded vesting schedule, the vesting period t is modified 
as (t+1)/2.  
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compensation, such as post-retirement benefits, for which the vesting schedules are usually 
unavailable. Our measure therefore only reflects the incentives arising from the current year’s 
compensation. In a sensitivity test, we calculate an alternative measure of pay duration by 
including stocks and options that were awarded in previous years. Our inferences based on this 
alternative measure remain the same. However this measurement has its own limitations. 
Obtaining similar results from both measures increases our confidence in the results. Please see 
Section 5.2 for a detailed discussion. 
3.3 Management Earnings Forecasts 
Figure 1 depicts the timeline of the variable measurement. To test our hypotheses, we focus 
on managers’ forecasts of the current period’s earnings, either annual or quarterly, issued after 
the earnings announcement for fiscal year t but before the end of fiscal year t+1. We exclude 
earnings forecasts issued between fiscal period-end and the earnings announcement dates, i.e., 
pre-announcements, because managers have less discretion in such forecasts.13  
Among the management forecasts issued during a year, we identify those forecasts that 
convey bad news to test our hypotheses. Prior studies classify a forecast as a bad news (good 
news) forecast if the forecasted value is lower (higher) than the most recent consensus analyst 
forecast (e.g., Anilowski et al. 2007; Cheng et al. 2013). However, when management forecasts 
are released contemporaneously with earnings announcements, the prevailing consensus analyst 
forecast is no longer a good proxy for the market’s up-to-date expectation of future earnings. To 
address this problem, we adopt Rogers and Van Buskirk’s (2013) procedure to calculate the 
conditional analyst expectations, which reflect the hypothetical analyst estimates that analysts 
                                                 
13 We follow previous studies (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Houston et al. 2010) in excluding pre-announcements 
because these forecasts are considered part of the earnings announcement strategy, not a voluntary disclosure 
activity. Our inferences remain the same when we include these pre-announcements in the measurement of forecast 
issuance and frequency (untabulated).  
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would have issued immediately following the earnings announcement but without the effect of 
management forecasts.14 Our results are similar when we use the traditional approach in defining 
forecast news (i.e., making no adjustments for bundled forecasts). 
We use two variables to capture the level of the voluntary disclosure of bad news: (1) an 
indicator for the issuance of bad news earnings forecasts (D_MF), and (2) the frequency of bad 
news earnings forecasts (N_MF). D_MF equals one if a firm issues bad news earnings forecasts 
at least once in a given year, and zero otherwise. N_MF is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the number of bad news earnings forecasts issued by the firm in a given year. This 
variable takes the value of zero if a firm does not issue any forecasts. We conduct a Probit 
regression when D_MF is the dependent variable and an OLS regression when N_MF is the 
dependent variable, to examine the effects of pay duration on the likelihood and frequency of bad 
news forecasts, respectively.  
3.4 Control Variables 
To ensure that pay duration does not capture the effect of other variables, we control for a 
series of variables that prior research suggests affect voluntary disclosures. First, we include the 
level of stock-based compensation (EQ_COMP) and the dollar value of managers’ equity 
holdings (SHAREHOLDING) because Nagar et al. (2003) find that these variables are positively 
associated with the issuance of managers’ earnings forecasts. Second, we include corporate 
governance variables such as institutional ownership (INST) and board independence (BIND). 
                                                 
14 For example, suppose a firm discloses earnings, Xt, for period t. Prior to the earnings announcement, analysts have 
expectations of earnings for both period t, E[Xt], and for period t+1, E[Xt+1]. If the firm issues an earnings forecast 
for the period t+1, f[Xt+1], on the earnings announcement date of the period t earnings, this forecast is regarded as a 
bundled forecast. For this forecast, the traditional approach, which uses the prevailing analyst estimates, measures 
forecast news as f[Xt+1] – E[Xt+1]. The problem with this approach is that given the earnings announcement, E[Xt+1] 
is stale. To address this problem, Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) compute forecast news as f[Xt+1] – E[Xt+1 | Xt]. If 
the difference between a management forecast and its conditional analyst expectation (in absolute value) is less than 
0.1% of the firm’s beginning price, we define the forecast news as ‘neutral,’ and do not consider it either a good 
news or bad news forecast. See Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) for details on estimating conditional analyst 
expectations (E[Xt+1 | Xt]). 
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Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vefeas (2005) find that corporate governance is 
positively related to the issuance of management forecasts. Third, following prior literature on 
voluntary disclosures (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Frankel et al. 
1995; Hutton 2005), we control for the number of analysts following (AC), analyst forecast 
dispersion (DISP), return volatility (RVOL), litigation (LIT), firm size (SIZE), market-to-book 
(MTB), equity issuance (EQ_ISS), and stock performance (RET).15 Finally, we include industry 
and year fixed effects in our regressions to control for the potential variation in disclosure 
activities over time and across industries. The measurement of these variables is explained in 
more detail in Appendix A. 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. 
The mean of D_MF is 0.3505, suggesting that 35% of firm-years in our sample provide bad news 
earnings forecasts at least once in the year. The mean of N_MF (before log transformation) is 
0.8999, indicating that our sample firms on average issue just under one bad news earnings 
forecast a year.16 The mean of P_DURATION is 1.4633, suggesting that managers’ total 
compensation in our sample on average vests in approximately one and a half years. More 
importantly, we observe a large variation in pay duration: the average pay duration is 0.1985 for 
the bottom 25% of the sample and 2.5361 for the top 25% of the sample (not tabulated). The 
mean of EQ_COMP is 0.3897, implying that 39% of total annual compensation is in the form of 
options and restricted stocks. The mean of SHAREHOLDING is $74 million. In addition, our 
sample firms on average have institutional ownership of 74% and nine analysts following, and 
                                                 
15 In the main analyses, LIT is measured as a dummy variable for highly litigious industries. In an untabulated 
analysis, we use an alternative measure based on the litigation risk model developed in Kim and Skinner (2012) and 
the inferences remain the same. 
16 Untabulated tests show that 38% of the firm-years in our sample provide good news earnings forecasts at least 
once in a year and on average firms issue one good news forecast a year. 
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75% of the firms have board independence of 60% or higher. The distributions of these and other 
firm characteristics in our sample are similar to those in recent studies on management forecasts 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2008; Feng et al. 2009). 
Panel B reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables. Consistent with 
hypothesis H1, P_DURATION is positively correlated with D_MF and N_MF. Not surprisingly, 
P_DURATION is highly correlated with the level of stock-based compensation, EQ_COMP 
(correlation coefficient=0.71). This strong correlation indicates that it is important to distinguish 
between the effect of the vesting period and that of the level of stock-based compensation per se. 
When both P_DURATION and EQ_COMP are included in the regressions, the coefficient on 
P_DURATION captures only the incremental effect of pay duration over the magnitude of the 
equity incentives. The correlation coefficients among the control variables are small, except 
those for analyst coverage and managers’ equity holdings (0.39) and firm size (0.46). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Pay Duration and Management Forecasts: Test of H1 
We use the following regression to test H1: 
ܯܨ௜,௧ାଵ		ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܲ_ܦܷܴܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߙଶܧܳ_ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߙଷܵܪܣܴܧܪܱܮܦܫܰܩ௜,௧	 ൅ ߙସܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ 	
൅ ߙହܣܥ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܦܫܵ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܴܸܱܮ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ ߙ଼ܤܫܰܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଽܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧
൅ ߙଵଵܯܶܤ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଵଶܧܳ_ܫܵ ௜ܵ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߙଵଷܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ାଵ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ
൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ																																																																																																																				ሺ1ሻ 
where ܯܨ௜,௧ାଵ	is the probability of issuing a bad news earnings forecast, ܲݎ݋ܾሺܦ_ܯܨ௜,௧ାଵ ൌ 1ሻ, 
or the natural logarithm of one plus the number of bad news forecast issued,	ܰ_ܯܨ௜,௧ାଵ. As noted 
above, we use the Probit regression for the former and OLS regression for the latter. All p-values 
are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-clustering and year-clustering to address the 
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potential correlation across observations (within the same firm or within the same year).17 The p-
values are one-sided for the variable of interest (for hypothesis testing) and two-sided otherwise. 
Table 3 presents the regression results. As reported in Column (1), the coefficient on 
P_DURATION in the Probit regression is significantly positive (p=0.001), suggesting that CEOs 
with longer pay durations are more likely to issue bad news earnings forecasts. The marginal 
effect is 4.4% when the pay duration increases from the first to the third quartile of the sample 
distribution while holding other independent variables at their respective means. This marginal 
effect is economically significant given that only 35% of the firm-years have bad news earnings 
forecasts. Only one variable has a higher marginal effect than P_DURATION: INST (7.4%). The 
inferences based on the OLS regression, as reported in Column (2), are the same. The coefficient 
on P_DURATION is significantly positive (p=0.001). A change in P_DURATION from the first 
to the third quartile of the sample distribution increases the number of bad news forecasts by 4%. 
These results are consistent with H1 that managers with long pay durations are more likely to 
issue bad news forecasts and issue bad news forecasts more frequently than those with short pay 
durations. 
The results for the control variables are largely consistent with those in previous studies 
(e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2009). We find that the likelihood and frequency of bad 
news management forecasts are positively correlated with institutional ownership (INST), analyst 
coverage (AC), board independence (BIND), and firm size (SIZE), and are negatively correlated 
with forecast dispersion (DISP), return volatility (RVOL), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and 
                                                 
17 In an untabulated analysis, we adopt an alternative design to control for the correlation of error terms for 
observations from the same firm: we estimate the regressions using the average of the variables over the sample 
period, with the exception of D_MF. D_MF is one if the firm issues at least one bad news management earnings 
forecast during the sample period and zero otherwise. The inferences are the same.  
20 
 
equity issuance (EQ_ISS).18 We find that the coefficient on EQ_COMP is insignificant. While 
this result may appear to be inconsistent with what is reported in Nagar et al. (2003), Nagar et al. 
(2003) do not separately examine bad news forecasts. We reconcile our results with those of 
Nagar et al. (2003) when we examine the likelihood and frequency of total management 
forecasts (including both good and bad news forecasts) in Section 5.4. 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation of the Effect of Pay Duration: Tests of H2 and H3 
H2 and H3 imply that the effect of pay duration on bad news earnings forecasts is stronger 
for firms with weaker governance and for firms with a more opaque information environment, 
respectively, than for other firms. To test H2 (H3), we construct an indicator variable for firms 
with weaker governance (a more opaque information environment) and then add the indicator 
variable and its interaction with pay duration to Equation (1).  
We use two variables to capture the effectiveness of corporate monitoring: board 
independence and institutional ownership. Both variables are widely used in the literature to 
capture the effectiveness of the monitoring of managers (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005). Specifically, 
we follow Chen et al. (2008) and construct an indicator variable, LOW_BIND, for firms with less 
independent boards, which equals one if less than 60% of the firm’s directors are independent, 
and zero otherwise. Similarly, we construct another indicator variable, LOW_INST, for firms 
with lower institutional ownership, which equals one if the firm’s institutional ownership (INST) 
is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. We then add an interaction term between these 
indicator variables and P_DURATION to Equation (1).19 Table 4 reports the regression results, 
with the results for board independence presented in Panel A and those for institutional 
                                                 
18 The coefficient on EQ_ISS should be interpreted with caution as only 8% of the firm-years have equity issuance. 
19 Because we include the indicator variable for lower levels of board independence (LOW_BIND) in the cross-
sectional analysis, we drop the original control variable of BIND from the regression model. We do the same for 
institutional ownership (INST) and analyst coverage (AC) in the respective cross-sectional test.  
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ownership presented in Panel B. As Table 4 shows, the coefficient on the interaction of 
P_DURATION with LOW_BIND is significantly positive (p=0.005 and 0.007, respectively), 
suggesting that the effect of pay duration on the management forecasts of bad news is more 
pronounced for firms with lower board independence. Similarly, the coefficient on the 
interaction of P_DURATION with LOW_INST is positive, although it is only significant in the 
analysis of the likelihood of bad news forecasts (p=0.002). 
Overall, these results suggest that if the monitoring by independent boards and/or 
institutional investors is not sufficiently strong to induce managers to provide more disclosures 
of bad news, the effect of long pay duration on bad news disclosure is greater.  
To test H3, we construct two indicator variables for firms with a more opaque information 
environment: one based on the level of analyst coverage (LOW_AC) and the other based on the 
probability of informed trade (HIGH_PIN). It is well-established in the literature that analyst 
coverage is positively correlated with the richness of the information environment, as financial 
analysts tend to follow firms with rich information environments,  and they also help to increase 
the amount of information available to investors (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001). Similarly, a large 
numbers of studies have used PIN to measure the extent of the information asymmetry among 
investors (Brown et al. 2004). LOW_AC equals one if a firm’s analyst coverage (AC) is below 
the sample median, and zero otherwise, and HIGH_PIN equals one if a firm’s probability of 
informed trade (PIN) over the previous eight quarters is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise.20  
Table 5 reports the results of the testing of H3, with Panel A presenting the results based on 
analyst coverage and Panel B the results based on the probability of informed trade. As Table 5 
                                                 
20 We thank Stephen Brown for sharing the data on the probability of informed trade 
(http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/sbrown/). 
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shows, the coefficient on the interaction of P_DURATION with LOW_AC is significantly 
positive (p=0.002 and 0.036, respectively). The coefficient on the interaction of P_DURATION 
with HIGH_PIN is also positive, although only significant in explaining the likelihood of bad 
news forecasts (p=0.030). These results suggest that the effect of pay duration on bad news 
earnings forecasts is stronger for firms with lower levels of analyst coverage or a higher 
likelihood of informed trading, which indicate a less transparent information environment.  
In sum, our results are consistent with H2 and H3 that the effect of pay duration on bad 
news disclosures is greater for firms with weaker governance and for firms with a more opaque 
information environment.  
 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 Controlling for the Endogeneity of Pay Duration  
As with previous studies on executive compensation, our study is subject to a potential 
endogeneity issue if pay duration and disclosure are both affected by common firm 
characteristics (e.g., Nagar et al. 2003). Note that in the above regressions, we control for the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure as suggested by prior research.21 To further address this 
potential endogeneity concern, we conduct two additional tests. In the first, we control for firm-
fixed effects. To the extent that both pay duration and disclosure are affected by unobservable 
(time-invariant) factors, the inclusion of firm-fixed effects can alleviate such a concern. (To the 
extent that our sample period is relatively short, the omitted variables are more likely to be time-
invariant.) Table 6 reports the regression results of this test. (Industry fixed effects are no longer 
included as they are subsumed by firm fixed effects.) Consistent with the results reported in 
Table 3, the coefficient on P_DURATION is positively correlated with the probability (p=0.099) 
                                                 
21 Our control variables also include the determinants of pay duration identified by Gopalan et al. (2013). 
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and frequency of the issuance of bad news (p=0.024).22   
In the second, untabulated, test, we use CEO tenure as an instrument variable and conduct a 
two-stage regression analysis. While Gopalan et al. (2013) report a negative relationship between 
CEO tenure and pay duration, there is no documented link between CEO tenure and the issuance 
of management earnings forecasts. The diagnostic tests, as suggested in Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010), indicate that CEO tenure is a valid instrument variable. The inferences from this analysis 
remain the same. 
In sum, these analyses indicate that our results are robust to controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of pay duration.  
5.2 Cumulative Measure of Pay Duration 
The pay duration measure used above focuses on the stock and option grants awarded in 
the current year and overlooks the duration of the stock and option grants awarded in the 
previous years. In this section, we estimate Equation (1) by using an alternative pay duration 
measure that incorporates the stock and option grants awarded in the current year as well as those 
awarded previously. Because Equilar provides detailed information about individual stock and 
option grants starting from 2006 when the new regulations on executive compensation became 
effective, we can only incorporate stock and option grants awarded in previous years from 2006 
onwards.23 For example, the cumulative measure for a CEO in 2008 includes options and stocks 
                                                 
22 We would like to caution the readers in regard to the fixed effect results from the Probit regression because the 
number of observations that are actually used in the estimation is reduced significantly to 2,776. To contribute to the 
estimation, a firm should have a variation in the issuance of bad news forecasts over time (i.e., having forecasts in 
some years and not having in other years). Firms that consistently have or consistently do not have forecasts 
throughout the sample period do not contribute to the estimation. Similar logic applies to the fixed effect OLS 
regression, but the sample size drops by a much smaller scale due to the variation in the frequency of bad news 
forecasts over the sample period.  
23 When constructing this measure, the values of previously awarded unvested stocks and options grants are re-
estimated at the end of each year. Stock values are calculated as (the closing price × the number of shares), and 
option values are calculated using the Black-Sholes formula. However, Equilar does not provide the exercise price 
and expiration date of the options awarded as part of long-term incentive plans. Therefore, for those options, we 
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granted in 2006, 2007, and 2008 that are still held by the CEO. Note that this cumulative 
measure is based on more years’ option and stock grants in the later part of the sample period 
(i.e., 2009 and 2010) than in the earlier part of the sample period (i.e., 2007 and 2008). In an 
untabulated analysis, we find that the main measure and this cumulative measure of pay duration 
are highly correlated in the later years of our sample period (correlation coefficient=0.87 in 2009 
and 0.85 in 2010), suggesting that the pay duration variable based on annual compensation can 
be used as a proxy for the overall pay duration. 
Table 7 reports the regression results. We find that the coefficient on the cumulative 
measure of P_DURATION is significantly positive in both the Probit and OLS regressions 
(p=0.004). These results suggest that the duration of total equity incentives has a positive effect 
on the likelihood and frequency of bad news earnings forecasts. We also obtain consistent results 
for other analyses when using the cumulative measure of pay duration and do not tabulate the 
results for the sake of space.  
5.3 The Effect of Pay Duration on Forecast Accuracy  
The analyses thus far have focused on the effect of pay duration on the quantity of 
management earnings forecasts. However, pay duration can also affect the quality of 
management forecasts if longer pay duration motivates managers to exert more effort in 
discovering high quality information and/or to spend more time analyzing and interpreting the 
newly acquired information. To investigate whether this is the case, we examine the effect of pay 
duration on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. We define MF_Accuracy as 
negative one times the average forecast error of bad news earnings forecasts issued in a given 
year. Forecast error is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between forecasted 
                                                                                                                                                             
assume that their values stay the same as their grant date present value, as provided in Equilar, throughout the 
vesting period. Excluding those options does not affect our inference.  
25 
 
earnings and actual earnings, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. We 
then regress MF_Accuracy on pay duration and the control variables using the following 
specification: 
ܯܨ_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௧ାଵ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܲ_ܦܷܴܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߛଶܧܳ_ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛଷܵܪܣܴܧܪܱܮܦܫܰܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߛସܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧
൅ ߛହܣܥ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܦܫܵ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܴܸܱܮ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛ଼ܤܫܰܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧
൅ ߛଵଵܯܶܤ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܧܳ_ܫܵ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵସܮܱܵ ௜ܵ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵହܣܤܵܥܪܩ_ܴܱܣ௜,௧ାଵ
൅ ߛଵ଺ܯܨ_ܪܱܴܫܼܱ ௜ܰ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵ଻ܯܨ_ܷܴܴܵܲܫܵܧ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵ଼ܫܯܴ௜,௧ାଵ
൅ 	ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ߤ௜,௧ାଵ																																																					ሺ2ሻ		 
Because MF_Accuracy is available only for firms that issue management earnings 
forecasts, the analysis is based on the 2,758 firm-year observations that issue management 
earnings forecasts (in the form of either point or range estimates). To address the potential 
selection bias, we include the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) calculated from Equation (1) as an 
additional control variable. In addition to the control variables included in Equation (1), we 
follow prior studies and control for firm performance in the year (LOSS, ABSCHG_ROA), 
managers’ forecast horizon (MF_HORIZON), and forecast surprise (MF_SURPRIZE). See the 
note to Table 8 for the measurement of these variables.  
Table 8 reports the regression results. As the table shows, the coefficient on P_DURATION 
is significantly positive (p=0.013), suggesting that managers with longer pay duration provide 
more accurate bad news earnings forecasts. Overall, the results suggest that longer pay durations 
improve not only the quantity but also the quality of bad news forecasts.  
5.4 The Effect of Pay Duration on Good News Forecasts and Total Management Forecasts  
In this section, we first explore the effect of pay duration on good news forecasts for the 
sake of completeness. Unlike for bad news forecasts, the expected effect of pay duration on good 
news forecasts is unclear. To the extent that long pay durations can lessen disclosure-related 
agency problems in general and not disclosing good news in a timely fashion is a manifestation 
of agency problems, one would expect managers with longer pay durations to be more likely to 
26 
 
issue good news forecasts. However, issuing forward-looking good news forecasts is subject to 
litigation risk because such forecasts may turn out to be wrong (Cheng and Lo 2006; Cheng et al. 
2013). Given that managers with long pay durations are more susceptible to litigation risks, these 
managers may be less likely to provide good news forecasts than those with short pay durations. 
In addition, unlike those with short pay durations, managers with long pay durations are less 
likely to enjoy the benefits of disclosing good news earlier. Therefore, whether pay duration 
affects the disclosure of good news is an empirical question.  
Table 9 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) by replacing the dependent variable 
with an indicator variable for the issuance of good news forecasts (Column 1) and the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of good news forecasts (Column 2). As Table 9 shows, the 
coefficient on P_DURATION is not statistically significant at the conventional levels. That is, we 
fail to find evidence that pay duration has a significant effect on the likelihood and frequency of 
good news forecasts.  
Next, for the sake of completeness and to reconcile our findings with those of Nagar et al. 
(2003), Table 9 also reports the results for total management forecasts (including both good news 
and bad news earnings forecasts), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable for the 
issuance (Column 3) and the natural logarithm of one plus the number (Column 4) of total 
management forecasts. Given the results for bad news forecasts, it is not surprising to find a 
significant coefficient on pay duration. However, the coefficient on EQ_COMP is insignificant. 
This result may appear to be inconsistent with what is reported in Nagar et al. (2003). Because 
P_DURATUION and EQ_COMP are highly correlated with each other and the common effect is 
not captured by either variable when both are included in the regression, the insignificant 
coefficient on EQ_COMP does not imply that EQ_COMP has no effect on disclosure. In an 
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untabulated analysis, we find that the coefficient on EQ_COMP is significantly positive when we 
drop P_DURATUION from the regression, as documented in Nagar et al. (2003), or when we use 
the residual pay duration obtained from a regression of P_DURATUION on EQ_COMP.   
5.5 Alternative Explanations for the Effect of Pay Duration on Bad News Disclosure 
One alternative explanation for the positive effect of pay duration on bad news disclosure is 
that managers with long pay durations opportunistically issue bad news earnings forecasts earlier 
when they are constrained to sell their newly awarded stock options/shares but later issue good 
news and/or withhold bad news when the previously awarded stock options/shares are vested. 
We do not believe that this alternative explanation is applicable. First, we obtain the same 
inferences when we use the cumulative measure of pay duration that includes the stock and 
option grants awarded in previous years, as discussed in Section 5.2. If the current options/stock 
grants are positively associated with bad news forecasts in the next year, but negatively 
associated with bad news forecasts in the following years, we would not have observed the 
strong results for the effect of options/stock granted in the past few years on the issuance of bad 
news forecasts. Second, in an untabulated analysis, we do not find that the cumulative measure 
of pay duration has a significant effect on good news forecasts, which is inconsistent with the 
argument that the duration of the stock and option grants awarded in the prior periods affect 
managers’ disclosure of good news in future periods.  
Another alternative explanation for our main results is that the effect of pay duration 
captures a non-linear relation between equity-based compensation and disclosure. To address this 
concern, in an untabulated analysis, we re-estimate Equation (1) after including the squared term 
of EQ_COMP and find that the coefficient on P_DURATION is still significantly positive. That 
is, even after controlling for the non-linear relationship between the magnitude of equity-based 
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compensation and disclosure, our inferences on pay duration remain the same.  
In sum, our results are not consistent with the opportunistic view that managers with long 
pay durations strategically provide more bad news forecasts or with the possibility that pay 
duration captures the non-linear relationship between equity-based compensation and disclosure. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this study, we investigate the effect of managers’ pay duration on voluntary disclosures. 
We hypothesize that managers with longer pay durations are more likely to issue bad news 
earnings forecasts because their welfare is less sensitive to short-term stock price drops and they 
benefit more from enhanced disclosures. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that managers 
with long pay durations are more likely to issue bad news earnings forecasts and issue bad news 
forecasts more frequently than those with short pay durations.  
We further find that the positive effect of pay duration on disclosure is more pronounced 
for firms with weaker governance, such as when board independence or institutional ownership 
is low, and for firms with a more opaque information environment, such as when analyst 
coverage is low and the probability of informed trade is high. These results suggest that pay 
duration plays a more important role in inducing managers to disclose bad news when firms have 
relatively weak corporate governance and an opaque information environment, where the 
marginal benefits of additional disclosure are greater.  
In the additional analyses, we find that (1) our results are robust to the endogeneity of pay 
duration, (2) the results hold when pay duration is calculated using stock and option grants 
awarded in the current and past years, (3) forecasts issued by managers with longer pay durations 
are more accurate than those issued by others, (4) pay duration is not significantly associated 
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with the disclosure of good news, and (5) the results are not driven by the alternative 
explanations that managers with long pay durations strategically disclose bad news earlier and 
withhold bad news later and that pay duration captures a non-linear relationship between equity-
based compensation and disclosure. 
Overall, our results indicate that increasing pay duration, i.e., increasing the vesting period 
of stock-based compensation, can effectively mitigate disclosure-related agency problems and 
motivate managers to convey bad news. The importance of increasing pay duration is 
particularly salient for firms in which there is a greater need to improve voluntary disclosures. 
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Appendix A Variable Description  
 
Variable  Definition 
D_MF = Indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues bad news earnings 
forecasts at least once in the year, and zero otherwise.  
 
N_MF = The natural logarithm of one plus the number of bad news management 
earnings forecasts issued in the year.  
 
MF_Accuracy = Negative one times the absolute value of the difference between the 
management earnings forecast and actual earnings, divided by the stock 
price at the beginning of the year. 
 
P_DURATION = Pay duration, measured as the weighted average of the vesting periods of 
the four components of executive compensation, i.e., salary, bonus, 
restricted stock grants, and stock option grants, with the weight being the 
relative size of each compensation component. The vesting periods of 
salary and bonus are set to be zero.  
 
EQ_COMP = The sum of the value of stock option grants and the value of restricted 
stock grants, divided by total compensation, where the value of option 
grants and restricted stock grants is the grant-date fair value. 
 
SHAREHOLDING = Natural logarithm of the dollar value of the CEO’s shareholdings (i.e., 
the number of shares held by the CEO multiplied by the firm’s closing 
stock price). 
 
INST = Institutional ownership, measured as the fraction of total outstanding 
shares held by institutional investors.  
 
AC = Analyst coverage, defined as the number of analysts who issue annual 
earnings forecasts for the firm. 
 
DISP = Analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of analyst 
earnings forecasts divided by the absolute value of the mean analyst 
forecast (using the summary statistics calculated last before the fiscal-
year end in IBES). 
  
RVOL = Return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the firm’s daily 
stock returns measured over the fiscal year. 
 
BIND = Board independence, which equals one if more than 60% of the firm’s 
directors are independent, and zero otherwise. 
 
LIT = Indicator variable for high litigation industries. This variable takes a 
value of one if the SIC code is within 2844-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 
3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 8731-8734, and zero otherwise. 
 
SIZE = Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.  
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MTB = Market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm’s market value of common 
equity divided by the book value of common equity. 
 
EQ_ISS = Indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues any equity offering 
during the year, and zero otherwise.  
 
RET = Market-adjusted annual stock returns, measured as the annual stock 
returns minus the value-weighted annual market returns. 
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Appendix B Example of the Calculation of Pay Duration  
 
To illustrate the computation of the pay duration variable, let us suppose that in a year, two 
CEOs are awarded compensation packages with identical dollar amounts but different vesting 
requirements, as described in the following table. It is further assumed that there is no other type 
of compensation. Note that these numbers are used only for illustration purposes. We assume 
that the total amount of compensation is the same for the two CEOs to show that we control for 
the level of compensation in the regression analyses.  
 CEO A CEO B 
1. Salary ($) 730,000 730,000 
2. Bonus ($) 320,000 320,000 
3. Restricted Stocks ($) 1,700,000 1,700,000 
 - Vesting Schedule (i) $850,000 will vest immediately 
(i) $850,000 will vest after 
three years 
 (ii) $850,000 will vest after one year 
(ii) $850,000 will vest after five 
years 
4. Stock Options ($) 1,250,000 1,250,000 
 - Vesting Schedule (i) $500,000 will vest after one year 
(i) $500,000 will vest after 
three years 
 (ii) $750,000 will vest after three years 
(ii) $750,000 will vest after five 
years 
Total Pay ($) 4,000,000 4,000,000 
 
The two compensation packages have the same dollar value of total pay at $4,000,000. The level 
of the stock-based compensation (i.e., restricted stocks and stock options) scaled by the total 
compensation is also the same for both packages, 74%, as calculated below:  
ൌ	 1,700,000 ൅ 1,250,000730,000 ൅ 320,000 ൅ 1,700,000 ൅ 1,250,000 ൌ 0.74 
 
However, the two compensation packages have different vesting schedules. Specifically, CEO 
B’s restricted stock and option grants have longer vesting periods than CEO A’s. As shown 
below, CEO A’s pay duration is 0.90 years, while CEO B’s pay duration is 3.01 years. 
(i) CEO A’s pay duration is 
ൌ	 ሺ850,000 ൈ 0 ൅ 850,000 ൈ 1ሻ ൅ ሺ500,000 ൈ 1 ൅ 750,000 ൈ 3ሻ730,000 ൅ 320,000 ൅ 1,700,000 ൅ 1,250,000 	ൌ 0.90 
(ii) CEO B’s pay duration is 
ൌ	 ሺ850,000 ൈ 1 ൅ 850,000 ൈ 3ሻ ൅ ሺ500,000 ൈ 3 ൅ 750,000 ൈ 5ሻ730,000 ൅ 320,000 ൅ 1,700,000 ൅ 1,250,000 	ൌ 3.01 
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Figure 1 Timeline of Compensation Award and Earnings Forecasts 
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Table 1 Sample Selection  
 
This table reports the sample selection process. 
 
Criteria Number of Observations
Number of firm-years in Equilar in the period 2006-2010 10,920
Less: 
Number of firm-years without earnings data on the Actual files form from First Call  150
Number of firm-years without data from I/B/E/S, 13F, Corporate Library, SDC, Compustat, or CRSP 3,084
Sample used in the analysis of the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts 7,686
Sample used in the analysis of management forecast accuracy 2,758
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. See Appendix A for the variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Management Forecasts and Firm Characteristics 
Variable N Mean STD Q1 Median Q3
D_MF 7,686 0.3505 0.4772 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
N_MF * 7,686 0.8999 1.6350 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
P_DURATION 7,686 1.4633 0.9125 0.8279 1.5926 2.0654
EQ_COMP 7,686 0.3897 0.2690 0.1979 0.3877 0.5794
SHAREHOLDING (in thousand) * 7,686 74,200 181,000 6,792 18,900 55,000
INST 7,686 0.7449 0.2235 0.6380 0.7940 0.9127
AC 7,686 9.4346 6.4583 4.0000 8.0000 13.0000
DISP 7,686 0.0725 0.1874 0.0101 0.0208 0.0517
RVOL  7,686 3.1295 1.4759 2.0769 2.7909 3.8037
BIND 7,686 0.7532 0.4312 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
LIT 7,686 0.2852 0.4515 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
SIZE (in million) * 7,686 9,239 23,202 632 2,030 6,437
MTB 7,686 2.9709 3.1555 1.3203 2.0191 3.2946
EQ_ISS 7,686 0.0882 0.2836 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RET 7,686 0.0379 0.4044 -0.2105 -0.0138 0.2032
* We use the natural logarithm of these variables in the correlation table and regression analyses.  
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Table 2 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Person Correlation Coefficients 
Correlation coefficients significant at the 5% level or lower are in boldface. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) D_MF 
(2) N_MF 0.75 
(3) P_DURATION 0.14 0.12 
(4) EQ_COMP 0.09 0.07 0.71 
(5) SHAREHOLDING 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.04 
(6) INST 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.09 
(7) AC 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.39 0.14 
(8) DISP -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 -0.12 
(9) RVOL -0.14 -0.11 -0.11 0.01 -0.22 -0.07 -0.19 0.18 
(10) BIND 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.10 -0.03 0.14 0.07 -0.02 0.00 
(11) LIT 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
(12) SIZE 0.03 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.33 -0.03 0.46 -0.06 -0.21 0.13 -0.22 
(13) MTB 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.15 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.16 -0.16 
(14) EQ_ISS -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.15 -0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 
(15) RET 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 
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Table 3 Pay Duration and Bad News Management Forecasts 
 
This table reports the results from the Probit regression of the likelihood of the issuance of bad news forecasts and 
the OLS regression of bad news forecast frequency. See Appendix A for the variable definitions. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-value is one-sided for the coefficient on P_DURATION 
and is two-sided otherwise. P-values are based on the standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. The 
marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability of issuing a bad news forecast when the variable of 
interest changes from the 1st to the 3rd quartile (or from 0 to 1 for the dummy variables) and other variables are held 
at the corresponding means. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
 Coefficient p-value 
Marginal 
Effect  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION (H1: +)  0.0911*** 0.001  0.044   0.0319*** 0.000 
EQ_COMP -0.0116 0.886 -0.002  -0.0022 0.938 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0262 0.120  0.018   0.0110* 0.080 
INST  0.6124*** 0.000  0.074   0.1636*** 0.000 
AC  0.0123*** 0.009  0.035   0.0042** 0.021 
DISP -1.0899*** 0.000 -0.016  -0.2344*** 0.000 
RVOL -0.0686*** 0.006 -0.041  -0.0239** 0.013 
BIND  0.1108** 0.010  0.034   0.0454*** 0.007 
LIT -0.0013 0.991  0.000  -0.0087 0.867 
SIZE  0.0439** 0.023  0.033   0.0276*** 0.004 
MTB -0.0227*** 0.004 -0.014  -0.0065** 0.031 
EQ_ISS -0.1721** 0.015  0.000  -0.0384** 0.029 
RET -0.0524 0.211 -0.007  -0.0138 0.409 
 
Industry Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 7,686  7,686 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1764  0.1760 
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Table 4 Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Effect of Pay Duration: Corporate Monitoring 
 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional variation of the effect of pay duration with the effectiveness of 
corporate monitoring: the Probit regression of the likelihood of the issuance of bad news forecasts (Column 1) and 
the OLS regression of bad news forecast frequency (Column 2). Panel A reports the results based on board 
independence and Panel B on institutional ownership. LOW_BIND is an indicator variable for firms with low levels 
of board independence and is set to one if less than 60% of the firm’s directors are independent, and zero otherwise. 
LOW_INST is an indicator variable for firms with low levels of institutional ownership and is set to one if the firm’s 
institutional ownership (INST) is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for the definitions 
of the other variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-value is one-sided 
for the coefficient on the interaction terms with P_DURATION and is two-sided otherwise. P-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Board Independence  
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION  0.0547 0.132   0.0187 0.111 
LOW_BIND -0.3098*** 0.000  -0.1076*** 0.000 
P_DURATION × LOW_BIND (H2: +)  0.1442*** 0.005    0.0475*** 0.007 
EQ_COMP -0.0271 0.730  -0.0074 0.785 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0280* 0.089   0.0116* 0.063 
INST  0.6071*** 0.000   0.1617*** 0.000 
AC  0.0119*** 0.010   0.0041** 0.021 
DISP -1.0931*** 0.000  -0.2367*** 0.000 
RVOL -0.0680*** 0.007  -0.0237** 0.014 
LIT -0.0043 0.969  -0.0096 0.856 
SIZE  0.0470** 0.015   0.0288*** 0.003 
MTB -0.0226*** 0.004  -0.0065** 0.033 
EQ_ISS -0.1716** 0.013  -0.0392** 0.025 
RET -0.0518 0.228  -0.0135 0.428 
 
Industry Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 7,686  7,686 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1776  0.1415 
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Table 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION  0.0534 0.115   0.0259** 0.029 
LOW_INST  -0.3077*** 0.000  -0.0716*** 0.003 
P_DURATION × LOW_INST (H2: +)  0.0822*** 0.002    0.0125 0.218 
EQ_COMP  0.0085 0.918   0.0033 0.908 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0301* 0.062   0.0123** 0.048 
AC  0.0126*** 0.006   0.0044** 0.014 
DISP -1.0982*** 0.000  -0.2369** 0.000 
RVOL -0.0726*** 0.005  -0.0253** 0.011 
BIND  0.1267*** 0.003   0.0497*** 0.004 
LIT  0.0026 0.981  -0.0082 0.874 
SIZE  0.0403** 0.041   0.0273*** 0.005 
MTB -0.0230*** 0.003  -0.0068** 0.026 
EQ_ISS -0.1773** 0.014  -0.0391** 0.026 
RET -0.0493 0.227  -0.0121 0.464 
 
Industry Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 7,686  7,686 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1745  0.1747 
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Table 5 Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Effect of Pay Duration: Information Environment 
 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional variation of the effect of pay duration with the quality of the 
information environment: the Probit regression of the likelihood of the issuance of bad news forecasts (Column 1) 
and the OLS regression of bad news forecast frequency (Column 2). Panel A reports the results based on analyst 
coverage and Panel B on the probability of informed trade. LOW_AC is an indicator variable for firms with low 
levels of analyst coverage and is set to one if the firm’s analyst coverage (AC) is below the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. HIGH_PIN is an indicator variable for firms with a high probability of informed trade and equals one if 
the firm’s median probability of informed trade (PIN) over the previous eight quarters is above the sample median, 
and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for the definition of other variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels. The p-value is one-sided for the coefficient on the interaction terms with P_DURATION and 
is two-sided otherwise. P-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Analyst Coverage 
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION  0.0356 0.254   0.0176* 0.072 
LOW_AC -0.3954*** 0.000  -0.1354*** 0.000 
P_DURATION × LOW_AC (H3: +)  0.1064*** 0.002   0.0233** 0.036 
EQ_COMP -0.0308 0.704  -0.0096 0.729 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0243 0.132   0.0097 0.114 
INST  0.5726*** 0.000   0.1477*** 0.000 
DISP -1.0994*** 0.000  -0.2351*** 0.000 
RVOL -0.0691*** 0.004  -0.0240** 0.010 
BIND  0.1086** 0.013   0.0443*** 0.009 
LIT  0.0030 0.978  -0.0114 0.825 
SIZE  0.0389** 0.034   0.0229** 0.012 
MTB -0.0242*** 0.002  -0.0074** 0.015 
EQ_ISS -0.1767*** 0.009  -0.0398** 0.017 
RET -0.053 0.196  -0.0139 0.402 
 
Industry Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 7,686  7,686 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1793  0.1794 
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Probability of Informed Trade 
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION  0.0604** 0.031   0.0269*** 0.006 
HIGH_PIN -0.0544 0.515  -0.0201 0.493 
P_DURATION × HIGH_PIN (H3: +)  0.0669** 0.030   0.0102 0.223 
EQ_COMP -0.0197 0.808  -0.0041 0.885 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0275 0.103   0.0109* 0.081 
INST  0.6092*** 0.000   0.1602*** 0.000 
AC  0.0133*** 0.005   0.0042** 0.026 
DISP -1.0988*** 0.000  -0.2348*** 0.000 
RVOL -0.0693*** 0.006  -0.0237** 0.012 
BIND  0.1145*** 0.007   0.0454*** 0.006 
LIT -0.003 0.978  -0.0086 0.869 
SIZE  0.0491** 0.013   0.0270*** 0.004 
MTB -0.0226*** 0.004  -0.0066** 0.026 
EQ_ISS -0.1728** 0.013  -0.0384** 0.027 
RET -0.0522 0.211  -0.0138 0.407 
 
Industry Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 7,685  7,685 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1768  0.1758 
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Table 6 Pay Duration and Bad News Management Forecasts: 
 Firm-Fixed Effect Approach 
 
This table reports the results from the Probit regression of the likelihood of the issuance of bad news forecasts 
(Column 1) and the OLS regression of bad news forecast frequency (Column 2) with the inclusion of firm-fixed 
effects. See Appendix A for the variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. The p-value is one-sided for the coefficient on P_DURATION and is two-sided otherwise. P-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION (H1: +)  0.0927* 0.099  
 
 0.0182** 0.024 
EQ_COMP -0.1229 0.617 -0.0266 0.472 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0863 0.136   0.0107 0.333 
INST  0.3646 0.445   0.1083 0.306 
AC  0.0308** 0.013   0.0031 0.188 
DISP -1.0191*** 0.000  -0.0691** 0.021 
RVOL  0.0281 0.745   0.0022 0.842 
BIND -0.2286** 0.031  -0.0434* 0.065 
LIT -0.3678 0.615   0.1123 0.478 
SIZE  0.8046*** 0.000   0.1308*** 0.000 
MTB -0.0548** 0.015  -0.0052* 0.056 
EQ_ISS  0.0248 0.856   0.0283** 0.042 
RET -0.3203*** 0.001  -0.0402*** 0.001 
   
Firm Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 2,776  7,366 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1886  0.5680 
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Table 7 Pay Duration and Bad News Management Forecasts: 
The Cumulative Measure of Pay Duration 
 
This table reports the results from the Probit regression of the likelihood of the issuance of bad news forecasts 
(Column 1) and the OLS regression of bad news forecast frequency (Column 2) using the cumulative measure of 
pay duration. This pay duration variable incorporates the stock and option grants awarded in the current and 
previous years. See Appendix A for the variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. The p-value is one-sided for the coefficient on P_DURATION and is two-sided otherwise. P-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF  
(2) 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION (H1: +)  0.0874*** 0.004 
 
 0.0269*** 0.004 
EQ_COMP  0.0383 0.621  0.0209 0.450 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0278 0.107   0.0115* 0.071 
INST  0.6127*** 0.000   0.1635*** 0.000 
AC  0.0123*** 0.009   0.0042** 0.020 
DISP -1.1036*** 0.000  -0.2375*** 0.000 
RVOL -0.0687*** 0.006  -0.0240** 0.013 
BIND  0.1152*** 0.008   0.0468*** 0.005 
LIT  0.0000 1.000  -0.0088 0.866 
SIZE  0.0465** 0.016   0.0287*** 0.002 
MTB -0.0222*** 0.005  -0.0064** 0.036 
EQ_ISS -0.1736** 0.015  -0.0391** 0.028 
RET -0.0537 0.209  -0.0143 0.392 
   
Industry Dummies Included  Included 
Year Dummies Included  Included 
N 7,686  7,686 
Pseudo / Adjusted R2 0.1764  0.1757 
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Table 8 Pay Duration and Management Forecast Accuracy  
This table reports the results from an OLS regression of forecast accuracy (MF_Accuracy) on pay duration and 
control variables: 
ܯܨ_ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜,௧ାଵ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܲ_ܦܷܴܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߛଶܧܳ_ܥܱܯ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛଷܵܪܣܴܧܪܱܮܦܫܰܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߛସܫܰܵ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߛହܣܥ௜,௧
൅ ߛ଺ܦܫܵ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߛ଻ܴܸܱܮ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛ଼ܤܫܰܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଽܮܫ ௜ܶ,௧ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଵܯܶܤ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܧܳ_ܫܵ ௜ܵ,௧
൅ ߛଵଷܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵସܮܱܵ ௜ܵ,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵହܣܤܵܥܪܩ_ܴܱܣ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵ଺ܯܨ_ܪܱܴܫܼܱ ௜ܰ,௧ାଵ
൅ ߛଵ଻ܯܨ_ܷܴܴܵܲܫܵܧ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ ߛଵ଼ܫܯܴ௜,௧ାଵ ൅ 	ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ
൅ ߤ௜,௧ାଵ																																																																																																																																																					ሺ2ሻ 
See Appendix A for the variable definitions. The additional variables used in this table are defined as follows: 
LOSS = An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports negative income before 
extraordinary items, and zero otherwise; 
ABSCHG_ROA = Absolute change in ROA, where ROA is measured as the income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
MF_HORIZON = The difference in days between the management forecast date and the earnings 
announcement date; 
MF_SURPRISE = Absolute value of the management forecast earnings minus analyst expectation, 
divided by the stock price at the beginning of the year; analyst expectation is 
adjusted using Rogers and Buskirk’s (2013) procedure for management forecasts 
issued with earnings announcements. 
The sample includes 2,758 firm-years that have at least one bad news management forecast. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION  0.0018** 0.013 
EQ_COMP  0.0003 0.735 
SHAREHOLDING  0.0008*** 0.000 
INST  0.0127** 0.016 
AC  0.0003*** 0.002 
DISP -0.0274** 0.012 
RVOL -0.0034*** 0.000 
BIND  0.0026** 0.015 
LIT  0.0003 0.747 
SIZE  0.0001 0.728 
MTB -0.0002 0.167 
EQ_ISS -0.0025 0.133 
RET -0.0048*** 0.000 
LOSS -0.0038*** 0.000 
ABSCHG_ROA -0.0042 0.129 
MF_HORIZON -0.0000*** 0.000 
MF_SURPRISE -0.6393*** 0.000 
IMR  0.0307*** 0.010 
Industry Dummies Included  
Year Dummies Included  
N 2,758  
Adjusted R2 0.3382  
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Table 9 Pay Duration and Good News and Total Management Forecasts 
 
The first two columns of this table report the results from the Probit regression of the likelihood of forecast issuance (Column 1) and the OLS regression of 
forecast frequency (Column 2) for good news forecasts. The next two columns of this table report the results from the Probit regression of the likelihood of 
forecast issuance (Column 3) and the OLS regression of forecast frequency (Column 4) for total management forecasts (i.e., both good news and bad news 
forecasts). See Appendix A for the variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All p-values are two-sided and are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Good News Forecasts  Total Forecasts 
  
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(1)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF 
(2)  
Dep. Var. = D_MF 
(3)  
Dep. Var. = N_MF 
(4) 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
P_DURATION   0.0732 0.177   0.0191 0.286   0.1122*** 0.009   0.0522** 0.014 
EQ_COMP   0.1091 0.546   0.0336 0.627   0.0394 0.752   0.0397 0.595 
SHAREHOLDING   0.0491** 0.014   0.0177*** 0.004   0.0258 0.168   0.0218** 0.028 
INST   0.5614*** 0.000   0.1546*** 0.000   0.6536*** 0.000   0.2746*** 0.000 
AC   0.0122* 0.083   0.0042 0.148   0.0185*** 0.004   0.0108*** 0.009 
DISP  -1.1513*** 0.000  -0.2528*** 0.000  -1.2428*** 0.000  -0.4597*** 0.000 
RVOL  -0.1193*** 0.000  -0.0576*** 0.000  -0.1378*** 0.000  -0.0876*** 0.000 
BIND   0.2018*** 0.000   0.0759*** 0.000   0.1719*** 0.001   0.1105*** 0.000 
LIT  -0.0388 0.751  -0.0034 0.943   0.0764 0.550   0.0252 0.757 
SIZE   0.0241 0.262   0.0183** 0.045   0.0458* 0.061   0.0443*** 0.002 
MTB  -0.0172*** 0.005  -0.0036 0.123  -0.0194** 0.010  -0.0061 0.154 
EQ_ISS  -0.2794*** 0.000  -0.0605*** 0.000  -0.2444*** 0.001  -0.0920*** 0.000 
RET   0.0670 0.219   0.0486*** 0.010   0.0247 0.590   0.0247 0.320 
 
Industry Dummies  Included   Included   Included   Included  
Year Dummies  Included   Included   Included   Included  
N  7,686   7,686   7,686   7,686  
Pseudo R2  0.2130   0.2214   0.2559   0.3106  
 
